























































This paper analyzes whether a corporate tax cut reduces profit 
shifting to low-tax countries. I use firm-level data of 2,812 
German corporations around the Business Tax Reform in 2008. 
Applying a difference-in-differences framework with a one-on-
one matching strategy, which compares earnings of 
multinational and domestic corporations, I do not find empirical 
evidence that even a 10 percentage points cut in the business tax 
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1. Introduction 
Policy makers in several countries seek reforms in tax laws to improve their position in 
international tax competition. Profit shifting of multinational companies is considered a major 
issue in high-tax countries, as it reduces taxable profits and thus domestic tax revenue. 
Companies with affiliates in low-tax countries may use manipulated transfer prices or inter-
company finance strategies to reallocate profits, and to reduce the overall tax burden on the 
group level. Several high-tax countries cut corporate tax rates in order to reduce tax rate 
differences to tax havens, and thus incentives to shift profits abroad to avoid domestic 
taxation: The German government identified a reduction of tax incentives for profit shifting to 
be a major goal of the 2008 tax reform.1 Similarly for the U.S., the President’s Framework for 
Business Tax Reform states that the “combination of a broader base and a lower rate would 
(…) reduce incentives for U.S. companies to move their operations abroad or to shift profits to 
lower-tax jurisdictions”.2 
Prior research on international profit shifting is large: Numerous studies have found 
empirical evidence for profit shifting within multinational enterprises. Subsidiaries in high-tax 
countries, which are part of an international group, show lower profitability than comparable 
subsidiaries without foreign affiliates (e.g., Dworin 1990; Oyelere and Emmanuel 1998; 
Langli and Saudagaran 2004; Egger, Eggert, and Winner 2010). Also, the level of reported 
pre-tax earnings is found to be sensitive to the local tax rate compared to the affiliate’s tax rate 
(e.g., Rousslang 1997; Collins, Kemsley, and Lang 1998; Mills and Newberry 2004; Clausing 
2009; Klassen and Laplante 2012a; Dischinger and Riedel 2011). Studies attempt different 
approaches to identify profit shifting through transfer pricing, on the one hand, and inter-
company financing strategies, on the other hand. Analyzing prices for imported and exported 
goods (e.g., Swenson 2001; Clausing 2003), the amount of international intrafirm trading 
(e.g., Clausing 2001 and 2006; Grubert 2003), or the level of EBIT (e.g., Hines and Rice 
1994; Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Maffini and Mokkas 2011) filters transfer pricing strategies. 
Numerous studies also provide evidence that the amount of internal loans is sensitive to the 
1  See the draft legislation of the tax reform act from 3/27/2007, available at 
http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/048/1604841.pdf, last accessed on 4/14/2014. 
2  See the President’s Framework for Business Tax Reform, A Joint Report by the White House and the 
Department of the Treasury, available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/The-
Presidents-Framework-for-Business-Tax-Reform-02-22-2012.pdf, last accessed on 4/14/2014; also, pp. 20/21 
of the Budget Statement from the Budget Bill 2013 in Sweden assumes that “internationalization means that 
international companies have great opportunities for tax planning by exploiting differences in national tax 
systems. (..) Competition for investment and the opportunities for tax planning in international groups 
demands active tax policy. In order to attract investment and provide good conditions for entrepreneurship in 
Sweden, it is important to have a competitive tax rate”, available at 
http://www.government.se/content/1/c6/20/39/65/8bd45b2b.pdf, last accessed on 4/14/2014. 
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tax rate, or tax rate difference (e.g., Desai, Foley, and Hines 2004; Hebous and Weichenrieder 
2010; Buettner et al. 2011). Additionally, thin-capitalization rules are identified to limit 
income shifting through financing strategies (e.g., Overesch and Wamser 2010; Buettner et al. 
2012). 
Although there is a large body of literature on profit shifting through transfer pricing 
and financing strategies, with many studies using tax rate variation to identify profit shifting, 
there are few studies analyzing the consequences of a specific tax cut on companies’ 
incentives. Previous studies are based on rudimental assumptions on the interaction between 
tax incentives and other factors influencing profit shifting strategies (e.g. shifting costs), but 
do not analyze in more detail how company reactions are affected by endogenous changes of 
shifting conditions. Put differently, many studies provide evidence that profit shifting exists, 
but only little is known about why and when companies change an existing strategy. Studies 
that analyze tax cuts use tax reforms more than 20 years ago (e.g., Harris 1993; Klassen et al. 
1993), but internationalization has increased since then and a lot more companies are 
operating globally. Also, transfer pricing strategies may have become more widespread and 
elaborate in the last 25 years. 
To contribute to this field, I use an innovative dataset of more than 2,800 listed and 
unlisted German corporations over the period 2004-2011.3 The dataset includes information 
on the location of the immediate shareholder.4 I analyze changes in companies’ profit shifting 
strategies after a tax cut using the German 2008 tax reform, which reduced the corporate tax 
rate significantly from about 40% to about 30% (depending on the local tax rate) and 
additionally increased legal barriers to profit shifting and documentation requirements. 
Therefore, I compare earnings of foreign-owned and domestically owned corporations around 
the 2008 tax reform. 
A graphical comparison of foreign-owned and domestically owned firms reveals a 
parallel trend in both earnings before interest and taxes, and pretax earnings. It supports 
previous findings of general profit shifting activities (e.g., Egger, Eggert, and Winner 2010) as 
earnings of foreign-owned subsidiaries are lower than earnings of domestic subsidiaries that 
are comparable in economic activity. However, there is no change in the parallel trend around 
2008 that would suggest that multinationals shift less profits abroad.  
3 While Harris (1993) and Klassen et al. (1993) use samples of between 37 and 191 multinational firms, my 
sample includes more than 1,400 multinational firms. 
4 In a robustness test, I alternatively use the ultimate shareholder, which is also available in the dataset. 
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I test the hypothesis using a difference-in-differences setting that analyzes differences 
between foreign-owned subsidiaries and domestically owned subsidiaries in EBIT and pre-tax 
earnings around the 2008 tax cut. I apply an exact one-on-one matching procedure without 
replacement according to pre-reform characteristics. This ensures that the companies 
compared are similar in size, asset structure, and turnover, and that the differences identified 
result from their shareholders being foreign or domestic. The matching approach also allows a 
separation of earnings changes due to profit shifting from a general economic trend. The 
setting includes several firm-level control variables, firm-fixed and year-fixed effects. If 
foreign-owned companies have adjusted their shifting strategy due to lower incentives, taxable 
earnings of multinationals should increase after the tax cut compared to domestic 
corporations. However, I do not find a significant change in earnings of foreign-owned 
subsidiaries compared to domestically owned subsidiaries after the tax cut that would point 
towards a change in profit shifting. I conduct several robustness tests to account for certain 
influences that may impact my approach in a way that prohibits the identification of a profit 
shifting effect. One concern is that the financial crisis around 2008 and 2009 affects 
subsidiaries of domestic and foreign shareholders differently. As foreign countries were hit by 
the crisis more severely than Germany, economic consequences of the shareholder country 
may have had an effect on the subsidiary as well. If this is the case, such an influence may 
eliminate a potential change in the difference between the two groups, and thus eliminate the 
identification of an effect. The impact of the financial crisis is captured by two robustness 
tests: First, I include the shareholder country’s GDP growth rate to account for the 
shareholder’s economic situation. Second, I limit the sample to firms that survive all sample 
years, and thus exclude corporations that went bankrupt and showed an abnormal, crisis-
related performance. Another robustness test analyzes the difference in earnings every year to 
account for a potential delay in multinationals’ reactions. As profit shifting requires an 
elaborate tax planning strategy, I focus on large companies in another robustness tests, since 
these companies may be more likely to have the resources needed for proficient tax planning. 
Eventually, I change the definition of a foreign-owned company to tie in with the ultimate 
owner, and rerun all regressions. None of these tests provides significant evidence for a 
change in taxable earnings of foreign-owned German subsidiaries compared to domestic 
subsidiaries. That is, the results do not suggest that multinationals change their profit shifting 
strategy after a tax cut, and shift less profits to tax havens.  
This coincides with Bucovetsky (2013), who derives from a model-based approach 
that sheltering of income depends on the fee that a tax haven charges and thus its credibility. 
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In this model, tax rates in high-tax countries, however, have an impact on the number of tax 
havens, but not on the amount of income shifted. However, there are more potential 
explanations: First, the tax rate difference may actually not be the main incentive for profit 
shifting. Instead, the incentive is stable over years due to transaction costs, administrative 
issues, and foreign tax credits (Klassen and Laplante 2012b). Therefore, profit shifting may be 
sticky. Second, given the lower business tax rate, the government’s disadvantage from profit 
shifting is lower and consequently there may be less governmental control. That way, shifting 
costs decrease and counteract the reduced tax incentive for profit shifting after the reform. 
Other explanations relate to certain conditions during the observation period. Due to the 
financial crisis, certain competitive goals may have been distorted, which may make profit 
shifting even more important for a company’s performance. Eventually, the tax cut may have 
triggered companies to shift accruals (e.g., depreciation expenses) to pre-reform years with a 
higher tax rate, resulting in higher earnings after the reform. This would cause a parallel trend 
of earnings of foreign-owned and domestic firms after the reform, and work against finding 
the expected effect. 
My findings are particularly relevant considering the ongoing “race to the bottom” in 
corporate tax rates in many countries. Whereas reactions in corporate investment following a 
tax cut are empirically supported (e.g., Brandstetter and Jacob 2013), expectations of the 
government related to profit shifting cannot be confirmed: the benefits of shifting earnings to 
tax havens may still be favorable after the tax cut. 
In the following, I first give an overview of the institutional background, and introduce 
the model that my hypothesis is based on. In section 3, the empirical design, and the data used 
are described. Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. The Effect of a Tax Rate Cut on International Profit Shifting 
2.1 Hypothesis Development 
I follow a standard model in prior research that the tax benefits of profit shifting are 
higher, the higher the tax difference between the two affiliated companies is (e.g., Dischinger 
2007; Huizinga and Laeven 2008; Weichenrieder 2009; Dharmapala and Riedel 2011). I use 
an inbound investment scenario with a foreign shareholder 𝐹, that controls the domestic 
subsidiary 𝐷. The domestic tax rate is 𝜏𝐷, the tax rate in the country of the shareholder 𝜏𝐹. 
Goods, services, or loans 𝐺 are transferred within the two companies. 𝐺 can be positive or 
negative: a positive sign of 𝐺 describes the number of units transferred from the shareholder to 
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the subsidiary; a negative sign means the opposite case. The arm’s length price for 𝐺, i.e, the 
good, service, or loan, is 𝑝. 𝐷 generates a taxable profit (without intercompany transactions) 
𝑃𝐷, 𝐹’s profit amounts to 𝑃𝐹. 𝜋 is the after-tax profit at group-level. Therefore, without any 
shifting efforts of the group, 𝜋 is 
𝜋 = (1 − 𝜏𝐷)(𝑃𝐷 − 𝑝𝐺) + (1 − 𝜏𝐹)(𝑃𝐹 + 𝑝𝐺)             (i) 
It is assumed that 𝐹 is able to modify the transfer price and thus cause profit shifting 
by setting a manipulated price (𝑝 + Δ𝑝). Δ𝑝 can be positive or negative: a positive 
modification of 𝑝 results in overpricing the good or service, or excessive interest payments; a 
negative modification results in underpricing.  
Manipulation of prices comes with costs (e.g., Huizinga and Laeven 2008). These 
costs arise due to the process of shifting a certain amount of profit to a tax haven (e.g. for tax 
compliance, documentation; also non-tax costs (distortion of intra-group inventive systems)). 
Costs are described by a concave function, with higher marginal costs the higher the total 
amount of profits shifted. However, shifting costs are hard to define. Profit shifting strategies 
are usually not public information about a company. Consequences, like effective tax rates, or 
complex group structures, are an indicator, but there is no exact information whether a 
corporate decision is mainly based on tax incentives. Consequently, companies’ costs to 
pursue these strategies are not public either.  
A company engages in profit shifting in order to maximize after-tax group profits: max𝜋 (Δ𝑝) = (1 − 𝜏𝐷)(𝑃𝐷 − (𝑝 + Δ𝑝)𝐺) + (1 − 𝜏𝐹)(𝑃𝐹 + (𝑝 + Δ𝑝)𝐺) − 𝐶(Δ𝑝) (ii) 
The first order condition with respect to Δ𝑝 is: 
𝜕𝜋(Δ𝑝)
𝜕(Δ𝑝) = 0                          (iii) (𝜏𝐷 − 𝜏𝐹)𝐺 = 𝜕𝐶(Δ𝑝)𝜕(Δ𝑝)                       (iv) 
Equation (iv) states the condition for optimal profit shifting. The left hand side gives 
the marginal (positive or negative) benefit of a price manipulation on the group’s after tax 
profit. The right hand side shows how the costs develop with the price change. According to 
equation (iv), there is a linear relation between Δ𝑝 and (𝜏𝐺 − 𝜏𝐹)𝑇. That is, the change in 
benefit is higher with a higher difference in tax rates, and with every unit of goods or services 
transferred. The shifting costs are assumed to be the limiting factor for the redistribution. The 
basic assumptions on the costs are: 
𝐶(Δ𝑝) ≥ 0                          (v) 
𝐶(Δ𝑝) = 0 𝑖𝑓 Δ𝑝=0                       (vi) 
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𝑑2𝐶(∆𝑝)
𝑑(∆𝑝)2 > 0                             (vii) 
Equations (v) to (vii) implicate that the costs rise with the extent of manipulation, 
regardless if positive or negative. If the price at arm’s length is chosen, no costs arise. Also, 
the higher | Δ𝑝|, the higher is the marginal rise in costs for further modification. A company 
group will refrain from profit shifting activities, when the benefit of further manipulation does 
not exceed the costs. If 𝐺 = 0 or if 𝜏𝐹 = 𝜏𝐺, there is either no option for price manipulations, 
or there is no resulting benefit. In all other cases, appropriate modifications lead to a 
reallocation of profits to the country with lower taxation, which result in tax savings on the 
group level.  
When a high-tax country cuts corporate taxes, the difference in corporate tax rates 
between 𝐹 and 𝐷 decreases, and so does the tax benefit resulting from shifting profits abroad 
as stated in Equation (iv). Then, marginal shifting costs exceed the benefits from price 
manipulation at a lower level of profit shifting. Therefore, Δ𝑝 and consequently the amount of 
profits shifted decreases. I state the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis: A corporate tax cut in a high-tax country leads to a reduction of profit 
shifting to low-tax countries within multinational enterprises. 
2.2 Institutional Setting 
Germany participated in the international “race to the bottom” in 2008: the business 
tax rate was cut by about ten percentage points from about 40% to about 30%, depending on 
the local tax rate. The tax cut resulted from the international tax competition, and countries’ 
efforts to establish an attractive tax environment for companies. The reform also included base 
broadening elements concretizing transfer pricing rules, and introducing the interest barrier 
rule that limits the amount of interest expenses that are deductible for tax purposes. This thin 
capitalization rule aims at cutting profit shifting through financing strategies. Both provisions 
may lead to a reduction of profit shifting, and act in favor of the hypothesis. Their effects are 
not separable from the effect of the corporate tax cut. However, Blaufus and Lorenz (2009) 
suggest that the interest barrier rule is only applicable to very few firms, due to several escape 
clauses. Therefore, I do not expect this rule to bias my results. In contrast, the stricter transfer 
pricing rules may strengthen results in support of the hypothesis. 
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3. Empirical Research Design and Data 
3.1 Estimation Strategy 
I use two difference-in-differences settings to test the hypothesis. This strategy 
compares earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) and pre-tax income of multinational and 
domestic corporations around the 2008 tax cut in Germany. That way, my approach covers 
shifting effects in transfer pricing, and financing strategies. The following two regression 
equations are used: 
𝐸𝐵𝐼𝑇𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡++𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
𝑃𝑟𝑒𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼0 + 𝛽1𝑀𝑁𝐸𝑖 × 𝑅𝑒𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑆𝑎𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝑎𝑏𝑜𝑟𝑖,𝑡++𝛽4𝐹𝑖𝑥𝑒𝑑𝑖,𝑡 +
𝛽5𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛼𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡   
(viii) 
(ix) 
Dependent variables are earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) in equation (viii), 
and pre-tax earnings (PreTax) in equation (ix). The independent variable of interest in both 
equations is the interaction term MNExReform. The dummy variable MNE is 1 for 
multinational enterprises and 0 for domestic enterprises. I define corporations as multinational 
if their direct shareholder, which holds an interest of more than 50 percent in the subsidiary, is 
situated in a country other than Germany. Subsidiaries with their shareholder in Germany are 
defined as domestic. I focus on German inbound investment as prior research finds significant 
evidence for profit shifting analyzing German inbound investment, but no or only weak 
evidence for German outbound investment (e.g., Weichenrieder 2009). The interaction term 
MNExReform captures the level of earnings of multinational firms compared to domestic firms 
after the 2008 tax cut. The respective country of the shareholder is not relevant for this 
definition. However, one robustness test analyzes the sensitivity of earnings to the tax rate 
differential of subsidiary and shareholder, which is tied to the particular foreign tax rate.  
According to the hypothesis stated above, both EBIT and pre-tax earnings of 
multinationals should increase compared to domestic companies. This results from the 
adjustment in profit shifting strategies: Due to lower tax incentives, multinationals are 
assumed to shift less taxable profits abroad, and keep more earnings in Germany. Domestic 
companies are less engaged in profit shifting, and do not show the respective reaction. Thus, 
the estimated coefficient of MNExReform is expected to be positive. The advantage of the 
difference-in-differences setting is that it accounts for the general trend in earnings: the 
observation period is severely affected by the financial crisis, which resulted in lower 
corporate earnings. If the consequences are identical for all companies, the difference-in-
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differences approach is efficient, as the effect results from the difference between 
domestically owned and foreign-owned corporations.5  
Another underlying assumption of the strategy is that treatment and control group, i.e. 
multinational and domestic corporations, only differ in the location of their shareholders, and 
that differences in their reactions to the 2008 tax cut are only due to that criteria. To make sure 
that there are no other structural differences between these two groups, which may bias the 
results, I conduct a one-on-one matching without replacement. Each domestic firm is matched 
to a multinational firm according to the natural logarithms of sales, labor costs, fixed and total 
assets of each year prior to the tax cut in the sample. Also, firms are matched within one 
industry. This approach ensures that the composition of the matched treatment and control 
groups does not change after the reform, and is thus not affected by reform effects. The 
matching procedure results in two equally large groups of companies with similar economic 
activities. 
The regression model also controls for the influences of sales, wages, the level of fixed 
assets, and loss firms on EBIT, or pre-tax earnings, respectively. Firm-fixed effects control for 
firm-specific characteristics that do not vary over time. Therefore, the main effect of MNE 
cannot be added separately.6 Year-fixed effects capture effects of the business cycle, and any 
other effects that are identical for every firm in the respective year. Similar to above, year 
dummies also cover the main effect of the Reform dummy.  
3.2 Data Description 
I use firm-level company data from Bureau van Dijk’s dafne database to test the 
hypothesis. The database contains financial data from German companies, as well as 
information about the company structure, industry, or business activity. The sample covers an 
observation period from 2004 to 2011, and consists of 1,406 subsidiaries with a domestic 
shareholder, and 1,406 subsidiaries with a foreign shareholder. This results in 15,981 
observations. I exclude companies offering financial or insurance services from the sample. 
All financial information is based on German accounting rules.  
5 If the financial crisis affects domestically owned firms differently than foreign-owned firms, my results may 
be biased. Therefore, I conduct two robustness tests to control for further potential influences of the crisis (see 
Chapters 4.3 and 4.4 below). 
6 This is based on the assumption that the ownership structure does not change over time. As the database dafne 
provides holding information only for the last reported date, potential changes in the ownership structure are 
not observable. Therefore, MNE is constant over time in this sample. Following Budd, Konings, and 
Slaughter (2005), I assume that this measurement error produces a bias towards zero. 
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I use two different ownership definitions to identify whether a German corporation is part 
of a multinational enterprise, and has therefore opportunities to shift taxable profit to another 
country, or if the company is part of a domestic enterprise with no (or less) opportunities: 
First, I assume German subsidiaries with a foreign direct majority shareholder to be 
multinational. In a robustness test, I define corporations with a foreign parent to be 
multinational, and thus able to shift profits. That way, I account for complex group structures, 
as well as direct and indirect shifting destinations.  
The composition of treatment and control group (foreign-owned and domestically owned 
corporations) is based on a one-on-one propensity score matching strategy without 
replacement. I obtain the propensity score for MNE from estimating a probit model for the 
year 2007. The natural logarithms of turnover, wages, fixed and total assets, as well as lagged 
variables of the two previous years are the independent variables. I match each observation 
from foreign-owned companies to an observation of domestically owned companies according 
to the nearest neighbor propensity score. The two groups of foreign-owned and domestically 
owned corporations resulting from this procedure do not change over the observation period. 
That is, changes in economic activities after the tax cut do not affect the composition of the 
groups. To make sure that treatment and control group are comparable, I estimate yearly t-
tests analyzing the means of the natural logarithms of turnover, wages, fixed, and total assets. 
The tests suggest that the groups do not significantly differ from each other. Therefore, 
differences in economic activities between the two groups should not bias my results. 
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the data used. Companies observed have average 
EBIT of 6.6m € and average pre-tax income of 7.3m €.7 Average turnover amounts to 171.6m 
€, average wages to 17.8m €, and average fixed assets to 51.4m €. Also, 14.4% of the 
observations have a negative income. 
[Insert Table 1 about here] 
The model developed above is based on the assumption that after the tax cut, the tax rate 
difference to low-tax countries, and thus the incentive to shift profits abroad, decreases. 
However, if foreign tax rates drop correspondingly, the model does not predict an effect on 
profit shifting. 8 Compared to available tax rates in the sample, Germany dropped from having 
7  Data coverage for pre-tax earnings is lower than for the other variables: there are only 14,907 observations 
available. 
8 Overesch and Rincke (2011) analyze tax rates developments in 32 European countries. They find that tax 
competition between countries has led to the observed race to the bottom. According to their simulation, the 
2006 tax level would have been 12.5 percentage points above the actual level, if tax competition did not play 
a role. Following Heinemann, Overesch, and Rincke (2010), a tax cutting reform is especially probable in 
countries, which are surrounded by low-tax countries. This suggests a possible chain reaction. 
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the fifth-highest of 63 business tax rates in the sample in 2007 to rank 17 in 2008. This change 
in ranks alone rejects the concern that the international tax rates’ race to the bottom could have 
eliminated the influence of the German tax cut on global tax competition, and therefore the tax 
rate difference analyzed. Even if the international trend in tax rates lowers the effect of the tax 




4.1 Graphical Evidence 
The graph in Figure 1 (Figure 2) plots EBIT (pre-tax earnings) of multinational 
corporations compared to the matched sample of domestic corporations to get a first hint of 
potential profit shifting reactions after the 2008 tax cut. Average earnings of foreign-owned 
companies are lower than average earnings of domestically owned companies with 
comparable economic activity over the observation period. This points towards profit shifting 
of multinationals as identified in prior studies (e.g., Egger, Eggert, and Winner 2010). 
[Insert Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
If multinational corporations adjust their profit shifting strategy as a consequence of 
the 2008 tax reform, and thus shift less taxable profits abroad, multinationals’ EBIT, or pre-
tax earnings, respectively, should increase compared to domestic companies after the tax cut. 
However, the graphs of multinational and domestic corporations remain parallel even after the 
reform.  
[Insert Figures 3 and 4 about here] 
Figure 3 (Figure 4) plots the difference in EBIT (pre-tax income) between domestic 
and foreign-owned subsidiaries. Both figures show a positive difference of earnings after the 
reform, suggesting that domestic subsidiaries still have higher earnings than multinationals 
after the reform. In case of EBIT, the difference even increases. 
None of the figures shows signs of a growth in earnings of foreign-owned subsidiaries 
compared to domestic subsidiaries, and therefore a reduction in shifting of taxable profits from 
Germany to low-tax countries.  
4.2 OLS Results 
I use a difference-in-differences approach to test the hypothesis. Results are displayed 
in Table 2. The independent variable of interest is the interaction of MNE and Reform: it 
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compares the level of earnings before interest and taxes of multinational and domestic 
companies after the 2008 tax cut in columns 1 and 2, and the level of pre-tax earnings in 
columns 3 and 4.9 That way, the approach covers shifting solely through the channel of 
transfer pricing on the one hand, and shifting through both transfer pricing and financing 
strategies on the other hand. Variables are used as natural logarithms in columns (1) and (3), 
and divided by prior year’s total assets in columns (2) and (4). 
[Insert Table 2 about here] 
The estimated coefficient of MNExReform is insignificant in all specifications. That is, 
there is no empirical evidence that earnings of foreign-owned subsidiaries increase compared 
to domestically owned subsidiaries after the tax cut, which would indicate that more taxable 
profits remain in Germany.  
There are several possible explanation for this result: First, multinationals’ profit 
shifting strategies are actually not sensitive to a tax cut. This supports Bucovetsky’s (2013) 
findings, who derives from a model-based approach that sheltering of income depends on the 
fee that a tax haven charges, and thus its credibility that is connected with this fee. Tax rates in 
high-tax countries, however, have an impact on the number of tax havens, but not on the 
amount of income shifted. Second, there may be high costs to adjust an existing profit shifting 
strategy that keep companies from modifying it (e.g., Chetty et al. 2011). Even if tax 
incentives have reduced, it is optimal to choose profits to be taxed in a jurisdiction where 
taxes are still lower. Due to transaction costs, tax administrative issues that would arise from a 
new strategy, and foreign tax credits that are tied to one country, the incentive for profit 
shifting may be stable over periods so that profit shifting may be sticky (Klassen and Laplante 
2012b). Third, given the lower business tax rate, the government’s disadvantage from profit 
shifting is lower and consequently there may be less governmental control. That way, shifting 
costs would decrease and allow more profit shifting after the reform. Other explanations relate 
to certain conditions during the observation period: due to the financial crisis, competitive 
goals may have been distorted, which made profit shifting even more important for a 
company’s performance. Eventually, the tax cut may have triggered companies to shift 
depreciation expenses to pre-reform years with a higher tax rate, resulting in higher earnings 
after the reform. This would cause a parallel trend of earnings of foreign-owned and domestic 
firms after the reform, and work against finding an effect in favor of the hypothesis. 
9 The number of observations varies due to differences in data availability between EBIT and pre-tax income. 
Also, there are less observations in the specifications using the natural logarithm as it is not defined for 
negative values. 
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The estimated coefficients of Sales and loss are as expected: an increase in the 
turnover of 10% would increase EBIT by 8.2%. The ratio of pre-tax income to prior year total 
assets of firms with negative income is 11% lower than of firms with positive income. 
Estimated coefficients of the other control variables are not significant. 
It may be argued that e.g. adjustment costs only postpone an adjustment, but not 
exclude it. The idea is that contracts have a certain duration, after which they need to be 
renegotiated anyway. The adaption to new tax incentives may thus not take place immediately 
after the 2008 tax cut, but with a certain delay. To identify a possible delay, I run the baseline 
regression, but split up the MNExReform variable into yearly effects for the years 2008 until 
2011. These variables capture the difference in the level of EBIT (or pre-tax income) between 
multinational and domestic enterprises for every single year. Results are presented in Table 3. 
[Insert Table 3 about here] 
The estimated coefficients of the variables MNEx2008 until MNEx2011 are 
insignificant in all specifications. That means, if the adjustment to the lower tax rate is just 
delayed, the effect is not identifiable until the year 2011. For a period of four years after the 
actual tax cut, a reduction in international profit shifting cannot be empirically identified. 
4.3 Influence of Economic Environment in Shareholder Country 
The economic situation during the observation period has been severely affected by the 
financial crisis in 2008 and 2009. The matching procedure, also the inclusion of year-fixed 
effects in the regression, and the difference-in-differences approach account for the business 
cycle. However, if the financial crisis has affected domestic and foreign-owned companies in 
different ways, my results may be biased. I include the GDP growth rate of the parent country 
in the regression to account for potential spillover effects on the German subsidiary. If the 
financial crisis hit the economy of foreign countries differently than Germany, and this effect 
had an influence on foreign-owned companies, which is different to the effect of the crisis on 
domestic companies, the variable GDP captures this impact. The results of this robustness test 
are presented in Table 4. 
[Insert Table 4 about here] 
Table 4 duplicates the baseline results, but adds the variable GDP. The estimated 
coefficient of GDP is insignificant in all specifications. Therefore, the economic differences 
between the parent country and Germany do not influence the level of EBIT and pre-tax 
earnings in a certain way. The negative sign of the estimated coefficient in three specifications 
suggests that a weaker economy in the parent’s country could lead to higher earnings on the 
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subsidiary level. This may be the result of higher investments in a country with a strong 
economy, rather than in an economic downturn, as this promises higher returns (e.g., 
Brandstetter and Jacob 2013, Becker and Riedel 2012). As foreign countries have experienced 
worse impact by the financial crisis than Germany has, such an influence of the GDP growth 
rate should rather bias my findings towards a positive result. However, the estimated 
coefficient of MNExReform is still insignificant. The difference in earnings between domestic 
and foreign-owned firms has not changed after the tax cut, and profit shifting has not 
decreased. 
4.4 Companies Surviving All Sample Years 
During the financial crisis, many companies left the market due to insolvency. Thus, 
there may be big differences across companies in the sample regarding how hard they have 
been hit by the crisis. If there are differences in insolvency risks between domestic and 
foreign-owned firms, the estimated coefficient for MNExReform is biased. If multinational 
subsidiaries’ earnings decrease stronger due to the crisis, the two effects – crisis and profit 
shifting adjustment – would even out. That is, the fact that there is no empirical evidence for a 
change in shifting activities so far may actually be due to the economic circumstances in the 
observation period. To account for these differences in insolvency risk, I restrict the sample to 
companies, which survive all sample years in the observation period. This excludes all 
corporations that have entered or exited the market during the years 2004 until 2011. All 
remaining companies should not have been existentially threatened by the crisis. Results are 
depicted in Table 5. 
[Insert Table 5 about here] 
The estimated coefficient for MNExReform is insignificant even for the restricted 
sample. The differences in insolvency risk do not bias the results in such a way that would not 
allow to identify changes in profit shifting. There is still no empirical evidence for a change in 
profit shifting as a reaction to the 2008 tax cut. 
4.5 Large Companies 
In another robustness test, I focus on large companies, which may be more likely to 
shift profits abroad than smaller companies due to scale economies in tax planning, i.e., which 
are also more likely to adjust their shifting strategy after the tax cut. Profit shifting requires a 
certain effort in tax planning, and experience in international tax planning, that not all 
companies have access to. Moreover, the absolute benefit from shifting profits abroad may 
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have an influence on the shifting decision in general, which means that profit shifting may 
only be interesting for larger companies with higher profits that can be subject to shifting. 
Smaller firms might not be involved in elaborate tax planning. I therefore conduct the baseline 
regressions for companies, whose total assets are higher than the median of total assets in the 
sample. Table 6 contains the regressions results. 
[Insert Table 6 about here] 
The estimated coefficient of MNExReform is insignificant, and economically very 
small. Even if the sample is restricted to those companies, which are more likely to engage in 
elaborate tax planning, there is no evidence that companies shift less profits abroad after the 
2008 tax cut. 
4.6 Sensitivity to Tax Rate Variation 
Further, I test whether the sample companies’ earnings show any sensitivity to tax rate 
variation in Germany or in the shareholder country. Even if most variation of tax rates in the 
sample results from the 2008 tax cut in Germany, other countries have also faced various tax 
rate changes. Tax rate changes in affiliate countries also change the level of tax advantages 
that result from shifting profits abroad. If multinational corporations adjust their transfer 
pricing strategies to tax changes, there should be a significant effect of the corporate tax rate 
variation on the level of earnings. I thus replace MNExReform by the difference in business 
tax rates between Germany and the respective country of the shareholder in the baseline 
regression. The variable taxdiff reflects all changes in corporate tax rates in the shareholder 
countries during the observation period 2004 to 2011. Results are displayed in Table 7. 
[Insert Table 7 about here] 
The estimated coefficient of taxdiff is insignificant in all four specifications. There is 
no evidence that the tax rate difference explains the level of earnings of foreign-owned 
subsidiaries and thus be the main incentive for profit shifting. This finding confirms Klassen 
and Laplante’s (2012b) concerns about using the foreign tax rate as a proxy for income 
shifting, as they assume the incentive for profit shifting to be stable across periods. This test 
supports prior results that German subsidiaries did not reduce activities to shift taxable profits 
from Germany to low-tax countries. 
4.7 Different Ownership Definition 
The previous empirical tests have assumed the direct shareholder to be the relevant 
destination for profit shifting of German subsidiaries. However, shifting networks within 
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multinational enterprises may be more complex. I thus change the definition of the relevant 
shifting destination, and conduct the baseline regressions as well as all robustness tests 
assuming the ultimate owner to be the relevant affiliate for profit shifting purposes. This 
robustness test accounts for different shifting networks within a company group.  
Results are not tabulated, but are comparable to the results obtained using the direct 
shareholder as the relevant affiliate. The tests do not suggest that corporations adjust their 
transfer pricing strategy after a tax rate cut. 
 
5. Conclusion 
The study analyzes whether a corporate tax cut in a high-tax country has an effect on 
profit shifting of foreign-owned subsidiaries to tax havens, i.e., if multinationals shift less 
taxable income to countries where profits are taxed a lower rate. I use a difference-in-
differences setting that compares EBIT and pre-tax earnings of foreign-owned and 
domestically owned German companies around the 2008 tax reform in Germany. The 
empirical tests do not provide significant evidence that earnings of foreign-owned subsidiaries 
have increased after the tax cut compared to domestically owned subsidiaries. According to 
multiple robustness tests, these results are not explained by the special economic 
circumstances in the observation period due to the financial crisis, amongst other factors. I 
cannot conclude that multinationals adjust their transfer pricing strategy after a tax cut, that 
less profit is shifted to tax havens, and that more taxable earnings remain in the subsidiary’s 
country. 
This raises concerns that the tax rate difference between the subsidiary’s country and 
the parent country may not be the main incentive for international profit shifting. Shifting may 
rather depend on the fee charged by tax havens for their credibility (Bucovetsky 2013). 
Alternatively, due to transaction costs, tax administrative issues, and foreign tax credits, 
existing shifting strategies may actually be long-term arrangements (Klassen and Laplante 
2012b).  
The study contributes to a large body of literature on international profit shifting. The 
results are particularly important considering the international “race to the bottom” in tax 
rates, and the expected partial self-financing of tax cuts. Whereas the effect on corporate 
investment as intended by governments can be empirically supported (e.g., Brandstetter and 
Jacob 2013), the policy makers’ expectations regarding profit shifting are not confirmed by 
this analysis. This can be of high importance for future tax reforms.  
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Figure 1: Average EBIT of 
Multinational and Domestic 
Firms 
Figure 2: Average Pre-tax income of 
Multinational and Domestic 
Firms 
This figure plots the average EBIT of domestic firms 
(dashed line) vs. foreign-owned firms (black line). 
EBIT is defined as earnings before interest and taxes 
divided by prior year total assets. 
This figure plots the average PreTax of domestic firms 
(dashed line) vs. foreign-owned firms (black line). 
PreTax is defined as pre-tax income divided by prior 
year total assets. 
  
  
Figure 3:  Difference between EBIT of 
Domestic and Multinational 
Firms 
Figure 4:  Difference between Pre-tax 
income of Domestic and 
Multinational Firms 
This figure plots the difference between average EBIT 
of domestic and multinational firms (black line). The 
upper and lower 95% confidence intervals are 
indicated by the grey lines. EBIT is defined as earnings 
before interest and taxes divided by prior year total 
assets. 
This figure plots the difference between average pre-
tax income of domestic and multinational firms (black 
line). The upper and lower 95% confidence intervals 
are indicated by the grey lines. PreTax is defined as 





Table 1: Summary Statistics 
This table presents summary statistics of the firm-level data used for the analysis. The panel consists of 2,812 firms, 
resulting in 15,981 observations between 2004 and 2011. Data source is dafne. 




Dependent variables    
EBIT Earnings before interest and taxes in 
thousand € 
6,630.78 146.03 4,126.43 
PreTax Pre-tax income in thousand € 7,279.30 116.44 4,333.10 
Independent variables    
Sales Turnover in thousand €  171,588.20 14,621.42 96,455.25 
Labor Wages in thousand €  17,776.39 2,184.26 14,797.81 
Fixed Fixed assets in thousand €  51,390.73 522.45 15,335.51 
Loss Dummy variable equal to 1 if 
income<0 
0.14 0 0 
 
Table 2: Profit Shifting Around the 2008 Tax Cut 
This table presents the regression results on firm’s EBIT and pre-tax income over 2004-2011. Dependent 
variable in columns (1) and (2) is EBIT, defined as the natural logarithm of earnings before interest and 
taxes in (1), and earnings before interest and taxes relative to prior year total assets in (2). Dependent 
variable in columns (3) and (4) is PreTax, defined as the natural logarithm of pre-tax income in (3), and pre-
tax income relative to prior year total assets in (4). The independent variables are defined in Table 1. They 
are used in logs in columns (1) and (3), and divided by prior year’s total assets in (2) and (4). I include firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 EBIT  PreTax 
 ln /totalt-1  ln /totalt-1 
MNExReform 0.0242 -0.0012  0.0316 0.0009 
 (0.034) (0.004)  (0.039) (0.004) 
Salest 0.8194*** 0.0362***  0.8447*** 0.0364*** 
 (0.049) (0.003)  (0.051) (0.003) 
Labort -0.0169 0.0010  -0.0221 0.0059 
 (0.056) (0.012)  (0.060) (0.013) 
Fixedt 0.0369** 0.0082  -0.0078 0.0083 
 (0.016) (0.011)  (0.018) (0.012) 
Losst -0.9963*** -0.1065***  -1.0939*** -0.1147*** 
 (0.064) (0.004)  (0.101) (0.004) 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 15,558 15,981  14,337 14,907 
R-squared 0.887 0.713  0.876 0.717 
 
20 
Table 3: Profit Shifting Around the 2008 Tax Cut: Effect by Year 
This table replicates Table 2 but presents regressions results, which estimate the reform effect separately for 
each year. Dependent variable in columns (1) and (2) is EBIT, defined as the natural logarithm of earnings 
before interest and taxes in (1), and earnings before interest and taxes relative to prior year total assets in 
(2). Dependent variable in columns (3) and (4) is PreTax, defined as the natural logarithm of pre-tax 
income in (3), and pre-tax income relative to prior year total assets in (4). The independent variables are 
defined in Table 1. They are used in logs in columns (1) and (3), and divided by prior year’s total assets in 
(2) and (4). I include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors, clustered 
at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 EBIT  PreTax 
 ln /totalt-1  ln /totalt-1 
MNE×2008 0.0031 -0.0018  0.0219 -0.0002 
 (0.041) (0.005)  (0.047) (0.005) 
MNE×2009 0.0205 0.0007  0.0239 0.0029 
 (0.050) (0.006)  (0.055) (0.006) 
MNE×2010 0.0217 -0.0040  0.0203 -0.0012 
 (0.047) (0.005)  (0.050) (0.006) 
MNE×2011 0.0584 0.0004  0.0632 0.0024 
 (0.048) (0.005)  (0.055) (0.006) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 15,558 15,981  14,337 14,907 
R-squared 0.887 0.713  0.876 0.717 
 
 
Table 4: Profit Shifting Around the 2008 Tax Cut: Controlling for Economic Situation in 
Shareholder Country 
This table replicates Table 2, but further includes GDP, the growth in the gross domestic product in the 
shareholder’s country, as additional control variable. I include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in 
all specifications. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * 
refer to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
 EBIT  PreTax 
 ln /totalt-1  ln /totalt-1 
MNExReform 0.0119 -0.0012  0.0237 0.0006 
 (0.035) (0.004)  (0.040) (0.004) 
GDPt -0.0089 0.0001  -0.0048 -0.0003 
 (0.007) (0.001)  (0.008) (0.001) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 15,542 15,960  14,322 14,886 




Table 5: Profit Shifting Around the 2008 Tax Cut: Firms Surviving All Sample Years 
This table replicates Table 2 but restricts the sample to firms that survived all sample years. I include firm 
fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors, clustered at the firm level, are 
reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2)  
 EBIT  PreTax 
 ln /totalt-1  ln /totalt-1 
MNE×Reform 0.0246 -0.0008  0.0243 0.0013 
 (0.035) (0.004)  (0.039) (0.004) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 15,012 15,333  13,826 14,302 
R-squared 0.886 0.712  0.875 0.719 
 
 
Table 6: Profit Shifting Around the 2008 Tax Cut: Large Firms 
This table replicates Table 2, but restricts the sample to firms, whose total assets are above the median of 
total assets in the sample. I include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard 
errors, clustered at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to a significance level of 
1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2)  
 EBIT  PreTax 
 ln /totalt-1  ln /totalt-1 
MNE×Reform 0.0003 0.0016  0.0025 0.0026 
 (0.050) (0.005)  (0.053) (0.006) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 7,779 8,169  7,559 7,999 
R-squared 0.822 0.748  0.825 0.747 
 
Table 7: Profit Shifting Around the 2008 Tax Cut: Sensitivity to Tax Rate Variation 
This table replicates Table 2, but measures sensitivity of earnings to tax rate variation instead of level 
changes. I include firm fixed effects and year fixed effects in all specifications. Standard errors, clustered 
at the firm level, are reported in parentheses. ***, **, and * refer to a significance level of 1%, 5%, and 
10%, respectively. 
 (1) (2)  
 EBIT  PreTax 
 ln /totalt-1  ln /totalt-1 
taxdiff 0.0005 0.0002  0.0009 -0.0000 
 (0.004) (0.000)  (0.004) (0.000) 
Controls Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Firm FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Year FE Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
Observations 15,520 15,947  14,302 14,873 
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